We use linear programming to provide a sensitivity analysis of Eisenberg and Noe's one-period model of contagion via direct bilateral links. We provide a formula for the sensitivities of clearing payments and the terminal wealth of each node to initial wealth of each node.
Introduction
Eisenberg and Noe [1] present a one-period model of contagion via direct bilateral links. They provide an algorithm for computing the payments that each node makes. Elsinger [2] extends their model to include cross-holdings of equity among nodes and multiple levels of seniority for debt. We use linear programming to provide a sensitivity analysis of the Eisenberg-Noe model, showing how the payments made and the terminal wealth of nodes are influenced by small changes in the initial wealth of each node. We use the same techniques to address multiple levels of seniority for debt and sensitivities to the nodes' liabilities in Liu and Staum [4] .
In systemic risk management, it is vital to address scenarios that involve large changes to wealth, but the analysis of sensitivity to small changes also has an important role to play. Sensitivity analysis is a crucial ingredient in optimization and risk allocation methods that are based on gradients.
We envision applications in which sensitivity analysis is applied in each of many scenarios sampled from a distribution describing shocks to the financial system. An average sensitivity across scenarios can be used to describe the impact of a small change in initial wealth on the expected performance of the financial system. For example, in Liu and Staum [4] , we use this scenario-byscenario sensitivity analysis of the Eisenberg-Noe model in a risk allocation method for deposit insurance.
The Eisenberg-Noe Model and Algorithm
In the Eisenberg-Noe model, there are N nodes which have promised to make certain payments to each other. Node i has initial wealth e i and has total liabilities ofp i . The fraction of its total liabilities owed to node j is Π ij . A node has no liabilities to itself, so Π ii = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N . Also, ifp i = 0, let Π ij = 0. If node i pays p i in total, then it pays p i Π ij to node j because of the equal priority of all liabilities. Then the terminal wealth of node j is
Let e, p,p, and v be the vectors whose ith components are respectively e i , p i ,p i , and v i ; let Π be the matrix whose (i, j)th element is Π ij . In this notation, Equation (1) can be rewritten as
Eisenberg and Noe [1] are concerned with the existence, uniqueness, and computation of a clearing payment vector satisfying the following conditions for all j = 1, . . . , N :
• the total payment node j makes is nonnegative and does not exceed its
• limited liability of equity: v j ≥ 0, and Our sensitivity analysis is based on a reformulation of the linear program Our method of sensitivity analysis takes the clearing payment vector as an input, and its computational complexity is O(N 3 ), dominated by the inver-sion of an N ×N matrix in Equation (3) . There are thousands of banks in the United States alone, so our method could be thousands of times faster than the brute-force method in large-scale applications. For applications in which sensitivity analysis is performed in each of many scenarios, the increased speed would be practically significant.
Alternative Linear Programs
For purposes of sensitivity analysis, P (c, e) can be reformulated by introducing the vector v of slack variables for the inequality constraint (I − Π )p ≤ e. The slack variables allow the formulation of an equality con- Proof. Suppose that x = [p; v] is not an optimal solution ofP (c, e). Becausẽ P (c, e) is equivalent to P (c, e), this implies that p is not an optimal solution of P (c, e). If p is infeasible, then it is not the clearing payment vector p * , which is feasible. If p is feasible but not optimal, then there exists a feasible p such that p j > p j for some j. 
Because p is feasible and c p > c p, p is not an optimal solution of P (c , e).
At the end of Section 1, we observed that the clearing payment vector p * is an optimal solution of P (c , e) for all c with strictly positive components.
Therefore p = p * .
Thus, if x = [p; v]
is not an optimal solution ofP (c, e), then whether or
Our approach is to solveP (c, e) once, for a single value of c whose components are all strictly positive (for example, all equal to one), to get x * , and then to compute sensitivities with respect to e 1 , . . . , e N by performing sensitivity analysis onP (ξ 1 , e), . . . ,P (ξ N , e) at x * . The reason to do this is thatP (c, e) has a unique optimal solution which is also optimal for each problemP (ξ j , e), whereas it is possible forP (ξ j , e) to have multiple optimal solutions, some of which are not optimal forP (ξ i , e) where i = j.
Sensitivity Analysis
To perform sensitivity analysis onP (ξ j , e), we consider bases for the optimal solution x * , which we characterize by introducing a classification of nodes. Because of the priority of debt over equity (discussed in Section 1), each node j falls into one of three mutually exclusive sets: and N + j is the index of the variable v j . Then
The following proposition uses the bases B + and B − to provide the desired sensitivity analysis. First, we define some notation. When a basis such as B is used as a subscript of a vector or matrix, the result is a vector or matrix formed by selecting the rows or columns whose indices are in B. 
If there is no borderline node, then ∂p
Proof. For any h = 1, 2, . . . , N , by Proposition 1, x * is an optimal solution toP (ξ h , e), whose objective function is [ With Equations (2) and (3), we can compute the partial derivatives of terminal wealth with respect to initial wealth:
If there is no borderline node, then ∂v * /∂e = I + (Π − I)∂p * /∂e.
Example
We These sensitivities indicate some facts which may interest an analyst of this three-node system. The sensitivity ∂ − p * 1 /∂e 1 ≈ 1.14 shows that a decrease of $1 in the initial wealth of node 1 causes the clearing payment made by that node to drop by more than $1. This happens because such a decrease also reduces the wealth flowing into node 2, making node 2 default, and thus reduces the clearing payment from node 2 to node 1, and hence the wealth flowing into node 1. From the sensitivities of v * to e, we see that whereas a decrease in the initial wealth of any node results in a loss of terminal wealth entirely borne by node 3, an increase in the initial wealth of node 1 results in a gain in terminal wealth split evenly between nodes 2 and 3, while an increase in the initial wealth of node 2 or 3 only increases the terminal wealth of that node itself.
